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Nontechnical Summary
That knowledge matters for economic growth is a proposition that is
at once both old and new. But the claim now has its greatest relevance
not in the growth impact of education, R&D, or science as tradition-
ally construed, but in the increasing importance in national income
of knowledge-products|computer software, new media, electronic
databases and libraries, and Internet delivery of goods and services.
I call these elements of the weightless economy knowledge-products,
not necessarily because they are knowledge-intensive in production,
but because their physical properties resemble those of knowledge. In
this reckoning, the economy is knowledge-intensive, not just because
of the quantity of knowledge used in production, but because of the
quantity of knowledge-products consumed.
The Industrial Revolution of late 18th-century Britain exploited
signicant amounts of new scientic and engineering knowledge in
steam engines, textiles manufacture, new methods of mining, and
other production processes.
Between 1950 and 1990, the number of US scientists and engineers
employed in research and development grew ve-fold, from 200,000
to over 1 million.
These developments undoubtedly contributed to economies be-
coming more knowledge-intensive. They dier, however, from changes
in the economy due to the increased importance of information tech-
nology, new media, libraries and databases, and genetic code intellec-
tual property, among others. In the latter, the products consumed are
weightless, i.e., they have themselves the properties of knowledge|
innite expansibility and irrelevance of physical distance; not so, by
contrast, for the 18th-century Industrial Revolution or for the devel-
opment of economies over the early 20th century.
Put succinctly, most notable about the very newest technologies
is not just greater quantities at higher qualities of the same old stu.
Instead, it is that the economic properties of what is consumed dier
importantly from those earlier.
This paper studies how that dierence might matter for economic
growth. In particular, it explores the notion that modern knowledge-
product technologies reduce a relevant \distance" between consumers
and knowledge-based production. The conjecture is that, as a result,
patterns of demand can have intricate and important eects on sub-
sequent economic growth and technological developments.
The idea that modern technologies bring closer together con-
sumers and knowledge production is distinct from the notion of gen-
eral purpose technologies, which potentially aect the entire economic
system at once, or that of skills-biased or directed technologies, which
target particular segments of the worker distribution. All the latter
focus on production-side characteristics. The distance reduction con-
sidered in this paper, by contrast, emphasizes the demand side.
(As just one example, recent information technology develop-
ments provide extreme cases where producers and consumers become
ever closer. The Linux operating system is likely the clearest such
instance|its current incarnation derives from improvements and re-
nements put in place by a large worldwide base of users. Consumer-
side characteristics bear directly on the ongoing development of the
technology. What this paper studies is not as stark or as direct, but
will display similar features.)
By denition, the latest technologies have not been around for
very long. Thus, convincing empirical time-series evidence on their
impact will be dicult to obtain. Instead, this paper builds its ar-
gument and seeks its evidence on two distinct fronts: 1. real-world
features of intellectual property protection in modern knowledge-
products and 2. the failure of the putative Industrial Revolution in
14th-century China.
In the traditional view on knowledge and growth, because knowl-
edge is costly to produce but easy to copy, societies require an in-
stitutional structure that protects the creators of knowledge and in-
centivizes them to create. A patents system is the standard such
institution.
However, a substantial fraction of knowledge-products property is
protected not by patents, but instead by copyright. Software and in-
formation compilations|signicant in the IT value chain|have, until
recently, largely been copyrighted, not patented. They are, there-
fore, legally the same as literary works. (However, in 1998 the US
Patent and Trademark Oce began to award patents for electronic-
commerce business models|among them, Open Market’s Internet
marketing and payments system; CyberGold’s attention-brokerage
scheme; Priceline.com’s buyer-driven, reverse auction model; Juno
Online Services’s advertisement-display techniques. Patent authori-
ties reasoned that these were performed on computers, and thus were
industrial, machine-driven processes.) Copyright protects an author’s
expression of an underlying set of ideas, but not the ideas themselves.
Under most current legal systems, copyright is routinely awarded to
any work showing originality, i.e., the work must not have been en-
tirely copied, and must have had sucient amount of labor, skill, and
judgement involved in its creation.
Patents, in contrast with copyrights, require that an invention be
novel, capable of industrial application, and innovative relative to the
current state of the art; they are a much stronger form of intellectual
property protection. For patents, the rst to create the knowledge-
product and thereby attain protection acquires the monopoly: There
is a natural, winner-take-all feature in the dynamics.
Returning to copyright, all that is needed is to show that the
work must have been the author’s own creation. But this implies
that there must be more than one way to implement an idea, as
otherwise the work could not have been the author’s own creation. An
important economic implication follows from this: Copyright is not
an intellectual property right allowing excludability and monopoly
operation. Under copyright, others can freely copy portions of any
work that are \critical", for which only one way exists to implement
the idea|because those parts of a work could not have been the
author’s own creation.
In copyright, priority is also immaterial. Unlike with patents, it
cannot matter whether a creator is the rst to create the original
instance of a copyrighted knowledge-product. Whatever central and
critical idea is in the knowledge-product is unprotected, and thus can
again be used by others.
Thus, just as knowledge-products are, in nature, easily copied,
they are similarly so in a sense under copyright law. From the per-
spective of the traditional knowledge and growth models described
above, copyright in IT should not work at all. Or, if copyright works,
it does so in a way dierent from that routinely used in modelling
knowledge protection in models of economic growth.
Consumers are not concerned in the same way rival producers
are about being able to extract, for their own use, the critical good
idea embedded in a copyright work left unprotected by law. (Al-
though even this is contentious: decompiling a piece of software to
see the critical idea|who decides when a particular subtlety is crit-
ical anyway|is almost certainly illegal.) It is the entire package of
ideas and attributes that is more important. Consumers do not nd
as attractive a knowledge-product generated by alternative producers
who bundle the central, unprotected attribute with other attributes
dierently implemented. Because those other attributes are protected
by copyright, by denition they must be implementable dierently.
Consumers just want to enjoy the whole work conveniently, without
inadvertently violating the law’s fair-use provisions by, say, viewing
the work in a computer’s volatile random access memory. This act
is impossible to perform without, in eect, making a copy|albeit
temporarily|and thus infringing the rights of reproduction on a copy-
right work.
For knowledge-products protected by copyright, the distance be-
tween producers and consumers is smaller than when knowledge is
protected by patent. The cost to a consumer of using a specic
knowledge-product comes not only from the sticker price of the prod-
uct, but from having to learn the norms, conventions, and subtleties
involved in using the product.
Turn now to 14-th century China. Over the Sung (960{1126 C.E.)
and Yuan (1127{1367 C.E.) dynasties, China became a technologi-
cally advanced economy. It had in place many of the same technical
developments that later made possible the Industrial Revolution in
late 18th-century Britain. Like Europe four centuries after, 14th-
century China had solved the problems of making agriculture highly
productive, eciently manufacturing ne textiles, exploiting and ap-
plying kinetic and thermal energy, and producing high-quality mate-
rials for tools. Yet no Industrial Revolution occurred in China. An
eminent economic historian calls this failure of 14-th century China
to take o \the greatest enigma in the history of technology".
The Chinese example illustrates a failure of technology-driven
growth. In the standard view, technology is cumulative and path-
dependent: Once technical advances occur, they should just keep
going. This, however, did not happen in Yuan China.
The puzzle lies not just in a comparison between China and Eu-
rope, but between a dynamic, innovative China before 1400 and a
stagnant, regressing China after. Cultural explanations alone, there-
fore, cannot suce.
China in the 14th century was not, of course, rife with software,
genetic code products, and copyrights instead of patents. Instead,
what it had was a severe mismatch between the supply and demand
sides of technology. While before 1400 the state had exclusively subsi-
dized the use of technologically-advanced goods, after that, it stopped
doing so. Similar forces were at work in other parts of the world, but
the extreme power and degree of exclusivity held in the hands of the
state was unique to China. After 1400, that component of technology
demand disappeared.
This paper builds on these observations to construct a model of
knowledge-products and growth where, in equilibrium, the structure
of demand determines patterns of aggregate economic growth. In
some equilibria, depending on consumer attitudes, the knowledge-
products industry languishes; in others, it is vital and fast-growing.
Although not central to this paper, implications on income dis-
tribution dynamics also follow from the model. Producers display
Superstar outcomes in that their distributions of incomes are an emer-
gent spreading-apart of the distributions of underlying attributes, and
are related to the clusters or groupings in consumers.
The model is naturally interpreted as one of the software industry.
Equally, however, it can be viewed to capture important elements of
other idea-producing activities, such as the academic profession for
one.
One policy implication from this study is the importance of train-
ing and education, not just in providing skills for work and produc-
tion, but in providing a suciently strong demand base. Unless a
demand side can be cultivated that appreciates and exploits sophis-
ticated and advancing technology, economic growth can slow or, ul-
timately, fail to continue. Training and education need not be along
narrowly-dened skills dimensions, but they can provide a double
impact in strengthening both demand and supply sides of technical
development.
Finally, patterns of demand emerge not just from developing skills
and education in the population at large. They are aected also by
government eorts at regulation. Government policy that strongly
curtails private use of new technologies|excess taxation, insucient
access provision|can have adverse long-run consequences on growth
in the economy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
That knowledge matters for economic growth is an observation that
is at once both old and new. But the claim now has its greatest
relevance not in the growth impact of education, R&D, or science as
traditionally construed, but in the increasing importance in national
income of knowledge-products|computer software, new media, elec-
tronic databases and libraries, and Internet delivery of goods and
services. These knowledge-products are so called, not necessarily be-
cause they are knowledge-intensive in production, but because their
physical properties resemble those of knowledge.
This paper conjectures that knowledge-products rely importantly
on demand for their ongoing growth and thus for their continued
contribution to economic development. But because many of the
relevant changes here are relatively recent, time-series evidence on
their importance can be dicult to obtain.1
Instead, the key idea the paper explores is that modern technolo-
gies associated with knowledge-products reduce the \distance" be-
tween consumers on the one hand and knowledge-based production on
the other. As a result, demand-side factors|consumer attitudes on
sophisticated goods; training, education, and skills for consumption
(rather than production)|importantly influence patterns of techno-
logical development, and therefore growth and economic development
more generally.
The idea that modern technologies bring closer together con-
sumers and knowledge-based production is distinct from that of gen-
eral purpose technologies (e.g., Helpman [11]), which potentially af-
fect the entire economic system at once, or that of skills-biased or
directed technologies, which target particular segments of worker dis-
tribution. All the latter focus on production-side characteristics; the
distance reduction considered in this paper, by contrast, emphasizes
1 Elliott [9], Jorgenson and Stiroh [15], Jung, Oh, and Shin [16],
Niininen [25], Sichel [35], and Wong [36] are useful recent studies in
this regard.
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the demand side.2
To develop the argument, the paper considers two seemingly dis-
parate sets of ideas:
1. 14th-century China was technologically advanced, and appeared
to be on the verge of an Industrial Revolution|why did one not
occur?
2. The properties of knowledge and information technology in gen-
eral, but computer software in particular, make them unusual
economic commodities|does the reduced distance between con-
sumers and knowledge-producers suggest new models of knowl-
edge and growth?
Section 2 briefly summarizes more traditional models of knowl-
edge and growth, and describes how, in the framework of this pa-
per, items 1.{2. are related. The section makes two points. First,
14th-century China provides an interesting example to study the re-
lation between technology and growth. Advanced in ways that, ac-
cording to some, paralleled the technological development of 18th-
century England, China nevertheless failed to take o to sustained
economic growth. Indeed, if anything, economic regress occurred over
the subsequent four centuries. Second, the increasing importance in
economies of information technology raises questions not easily dealt
with in traditional models of knowledge and growth. In this paper’s
analysis, these two|14th-century China and late 20th-century in-
formation technology|share a common feature: they emphasize the
importance of consumer characteristics for determining the creation
of knowledge-like goods and thus ongoing technological development.
Section 3 develops a model to analyze economic growth and de-
velopment, emphasizing the importance of relating 1.{2. The model
diers from others that deal with knowledge and growth in its focus
2 Recent information technology developments provide extreme
examples where producers and consumers become ever closer. The
Linux operating system is likely the clearest such instance|its cur-
rent incarnation derives from improvements and renements put in
place by a large worldwide base of users.
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on how demand-side|rather than supply-side|considerations can be
important for determining growth outcomes.3 In the model, demand-
side factors produce a range of predictions interpretable as consistent
with observations surrounding both 14th-century China and modern
information technology. Consumer aversion towards using sophisti-
cated technology can result in economic growth slowing or, in an
extreme, failing to occur.
Section 4 concludes, summarizing the lessons from this study.
2 TECHNOLOGY, 14TH-CENTURY CHINA, AND
GROWTH
Economists concerned with growth have long recognized the impor-
tance of technical progress.4 Leading theoretical models of technology
and growth (e.g., Aghion and Howitt [1], Grossman and Helpman [10],
and Romer [32]) have provided explicit economic descriptions of how
technical progress, evolving through incentives and markets, drives
economic growth.
To understand the insights from models of endogenous technology
and growth, and to relate them to information technology (IT) in
economic development, it helps to rst situate the discussion in a
broader literature.
2.1 Some economics of knowledge
Arrow [2] rst formalized diculties in the market for knowledge
(see also the exposition in Dasgupta [4]). The property of knowledge
most relevant for understanding IT is called innite expansibility by
David [6] (citing Thomas Jeerson [18]) and nonrivalry by Romer [32].
3 Of course, this statement should be read to refer only to a dif-
ference in emphasis. In any general equilibrium model, both demand
and supply side contribute to the equilibrium outcome.
4 Keely and Quah [17] trace how this holds even for the neoclassical
growth analyses of the 1950s. In this view, where many later writings
dier is in their making explicit the economic incentives for generating
technology, not necessarily in identifying new sources of growth.
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These terms refer to the physical property of knowledge that it is not
drawn down with use: an item of knowledge, once in place, can be
used repeatedly, by many dierent users, in many dierent locations
without the original piece of knowledge itself being degraded. So too
computer software.5
Innite expansibility implies knowledge has marginal cost equal
to zero (for all practical purposes). But then, as long as marginal
benets remain positive, social eciency requires that markets be
flooded with free copies of that item of knowledge.
This last statement is normative. It goes beyond the predictive
observation that knowledge, information, and ideas have an inherent
tendency to disseminate freely and widely, i.e., is naturally nonex-
cludable. Instead, the statement stresses that their doing so is a
necessary condition for outcomes to be (ex-post) ecient.
The diculty, of course, is that should free dissemination occur,
no economic agent would have the incentive to develop new pieces of
knowledge in the rst instance. An economic agent looking ahead
sees the equilibrium price on the result of her eorts to be zero.
Why not do something else then|appropriately compensating for
one’s time|instead of producing new knowledge? Rational forward-
looking agents will not produce knowledge, and thus the zero price
for knowledge comes with zero quantity in equilibrium.
This market failure in knowledge reflects the tension between ex-
ante incentive and ex-post eciency. In public nance theory, such
a public-goods problem might be solved by direct government inter-
vention. For knowledge, the interventionist solution has observable
counterparts in the institutions of patronage and procurement.
An example of patronage is public research funding, say by the
ESRC in the UK or the NSF in the US. Grants are awarded based
5 The software example here and the intellectual property one be-
low emphasize that knowledge and information in this analysis raise
issues markedly dierent from those typically studied in, say, the
\economics of information." One can usefully analyze the economic
impact of a word-processing package, process-controller software, ge-
netic libraries, or database usage, without moral hazard, adverse se-
lection, or contracts being at all central to the study.
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on competitive proposals; research problems are determined by the
investigator (not the source of the funding); and complete public dis-
closure of the research ndings is agreed. Patronage is the dominant
model of open science in Anglo-Saxon societies.
Examples of procurement, by contrast, are defense or space re-
search, where government provides the resources to investigate ques-
tions that it, not the researcher, sets and where disclosure of the nd-
ings need not be total. Useful spinos|commercial radar, jet engine
technology, the Internet|then enter the public realm of productive
knowledge.
In describing patronage and procurement, I have followed the \3
P’s" terminology from David [7]. The third \P" is property, in the
form of patents and copyrights, or intellectual property more broadly.
Under property, society awards monopoly rights to the private creator
of an item of knowledge. A market then forms in that the originator
of the knowledge earns license fees from users; unlicensed copies of
that protected knowledge are illegal.
All three P’s are second-best solutions to an endemic market fail-
ure in producing and distributing knowledge. The last of these, the in-
tellectual property rights regime, by no means necessarily restores the
rst-best ecient outcome. Indeed, under dierent circumstances,
one or the other of the three alternatives might be socially preferred
(e.g., Wright [37]).
2.2 Knowledge in economic growth
How have models of knowledge-driven economic growth treated these
theoretical diculties in the production and distribution of knowl-
edge?
Almost all formal analyses have sidestepped the more primitive
issues described above, and assumed directly the existence of a sys-
tem of intellectual property rights. In Romer [32], a stock of skilled
workers|researchers, scientists, inventors, intellectuals|is available
to generate ideas and new knowledge (Fig. 1). The greater the num-
ber of researchers and idea-producers, the faster the economy grows.
Skilled workers face competing uses for their time and expertise: they
can decide to be managers and lawyers, rather than research scien-
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tists. In equilibrium, returns equalize across the dierent lines of
activity for skilled workers, thereby determining the growth rate of
the economy.
What is the payo from producing knowledge? Upon obtaining
a useful idea, the researcher obtains a patent for it, and sells that
patent to a machine-maker. The machine-maker builds a machine
around the idea. It then rents the machine to a monopolistically com-
petitive manufacturing industry who|combining the machine with
skilled managerial input|retail the nal products to consumers. In
equilibrium, the present discounted value of the stream of monopoly
rent supports a positive equilibrium price on the patent.
Models in Aghion and Howitt [1], Grossman and Helpman [10],
and others dier in focus and details from the description just given.
For instance, Aghion and Howitt [1] study Schumpeterian dynamics,
with the latest discoveries making obsolete earlier ones in a wave of
creative destruction. Grossman and Helpman [10] consider schemes
where economic goods proceed up a quality ladder, through the ap-
plication of resources to R&D.6
In the framework just described, consumers come into contact
with knowledge only through physical goods embodying the new
technology. A chain of production runs from ideas being discovered
through a patent protection scheme through a manufactured goods
industry and nally to the consumer. Consumers are distanced from
the producers of knowledge: indeed, consumers need never be aware
of the innite expansibility in knowledge underlying production.
Such a separation matters under two circumstances. First, with
increasing pervasiveness of IT in general, and computer software in
particular, the eective distance diminishes between consumers and
knowledge production (Fig. 2). Consumer characteristics then have
important impact on knowledge production and technical progress. A
6 There is sucient commonality, however, across all such models
that Jones [13] can persuasively criticize the entire class of \technol-
ogy and growth" models by pointing out that while US scientists and
engineers employed in R&D grew ve-fold from 200,000 in 1950 to
over 1 million in 1990, the growth rate of US GDP failed to increase
by anything remotely comparable.
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second circumstance is when severe enough mismatch appears some-
where along the chain between knowledge production and eventual
consumption. China in the 14th-century, when an Industrial Revolu-
tion comparable to that in the West should have happened but did
not, provides useful lessons here.
I now describe these two situations in greater detail, and use them
to motivate the theoretical model in Section 3 below.
2.3 Knowledge-products and IT
The increasing importance of information technology shortens the
eective distance between consumers and knowledge producers. By
this, I don’t mean that consumers directly eat the engineering and sci-
entic knowledge being produced in R&D labs. Instead, I mean that
software, although not in the usual sense scientic knowledge, has
all the same physical and economic properties as traditional forms of
knowledge. The same holds for information in electronic and biologi-
cal libraries and databases.7 Thus, the resource-allocation diculties
for producing and distributing knowledge described above emerges
with equal force for these knowledge-products. Consumer attitudes
on using knowledge-products will increasingly aect the workings of
whatever mechanism is in place for producing and distributing intel-
lectual property.
A rst complication in using standard models of knowledge and
growth for analyzing IT is that knowledge-products are not typically
made excludable by patent. Software and information compilations|
signicant in the IT value chain|have, until recently, largely been
copyrighted, not patented. They are, therefore, legally the same
as literary works.8 Copyright protects an author’s expression of an
7 Quah [26, 29, 30] labels these elements of the weightless economy.
8 See, e.g., the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988. Sec-
tion 1(2)(c) of the UK Patents Act 1977 explicitly excludes computer
programs (Holyoak and Torremans [12]), although in 1998 the US
Patent and Trademark Oce began to award patents for electronic-
commerce business models|among them, Open Market’s Internet
marketing and payments system; CyberGold’s attention-brokerage
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underlying set of ideas, but not the ideas themselves. Under most
current legal systems, copyright is routinely awarded to any work
showing originality, i.e., the work must not have been entirely copied,
and must have had sucient amount of labor, skill, and judgement
involved in its creation.
Patents, in contrast with copyrights, require that an invention
be novel, capable of industrial application, and innovative relative to
the current state of the art. Patents comprise a much stronger form
of intellectual property protection. For patents, the rst to create
the knowledge-product and thereby attain protection acquires the
monopoly: There is a natural winner-take-all feature in the dynamics.
Returning to copyright, all that is needed is to show that the
work must have been the author’s own creation. But this implies
that there must be more than one way to implement an idea, as
otherwise the work could not have been the author’s own creation. An
important economic implication follows from this: Copyright is not
an intellectual property right allowing excludability and monopoly
operation. Under copyright, others can freely copy portions of any
work that are \critical", for which only one way exists to implement
the idea|because those parts of a work could not have been the
author’s own creation.
In copyright, priority is also immaterial. Unlike with patents, it
cannot matter whether a creator is the rst to create the original
instance of a copyrighted knowledge-product. Whatever central and
critical idea is in the knowledge-product is unprotected, and thus can
again be used by others.
Thus, just as knowledge-products are, in nature, easily copied,
they are similarly so in a sense, under copyright law. From the per-
spective of the traditional knowledge and growth models described
above, copyright in IT should not work at all. Or, if copyright works,
it does so in a way dierent from that routinely used in modelling
knowledge protection in models of economic growth.
scheme; Priceline.com’s buyer-driven, reverse auction model; Juno
Online Services’s advertisement-display techniques. Patent authori-
ties reasoned that these were performed on computers, and thus were
industrial, machine-driven processes.
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Consumers are not concerned in the same way rival producers
are about being able to extract, for their own use, the critical good
idea embedded in a copyright work left unprotected by law.9 The
entire package of ideas and attributes is the more important. Con-
sumers do not nd as attractive a knowledge-product generated by
alternative producers who bundle the central, unprotected attribute
with other attributes dierently implemented. (Because those other
attributes are protected by copyright, by denition they must be im-
plementable dierently.) Consumers just want to enjoy the whole
work conveniently, without inadvertently violating the law’s fair-use
provisions by, say, viewing the work in a computer’s volatile random
access memory. (This act is impossible to perform without, in eect,
making a copy|albeit temporarily|and thus infringing the rights of
reproduction on a copyright work.)
For knowledge-products protected by copyright, the distance be-
tween producers and consumers is smaller than when knowledge is
protected by patent. The cost to a consumer of using a specic
knowledge-product comes not only from the sticker price of the prod-
uct, but from having to learn the norms, conventions, and subtleties
involved in using the product. This feature will be used critically in
the model in Section 3 below.
Of course, knowledge-products are not all of IT. Computer hard-
ware, in particular, can be understood within the standard models of
technology and growth described above. But hardware in 1997 was
only one-third of IT. In the foreseeable future it will likely become a
progressively smaller fraction of the total.
Does this matter for poorer developing economies? In India, per
capita annual income in 1995 was US$340: The majority of the pop-
ulation of 900m lived on less than US$1 a day. Yet, for the rest of
the world, India hosts in Bangalore a major oshore high-tech soft-
ware center. Indian software production in 1997 was a US$2 billion
industry, employing 260,000 people. The software industry in India
has had revenues growing by 50% a year for the last ve years, with
9 Although even this is contentious: decompiling a piece of soft-
ware to see the critical idea|who decides when a particular subtlety
is critical anyway|is almost certainly illegal.
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over 60% generated as export earnings (in 1997 Europe accounted
for 22% and the US 59% of Indian software exports; India’s domes-
tic software market generated revenues of US$0.8 billion). Earnings
of entry-level programmers in Bangalore might be less than 10% of
their Western counterparts, but it is double that in the Indian Civil
Service. This success has likely been due to a combination of factors:
predominance of the English language in software programming and
models; the ability to transmit value and work in the form of software
code over the Internet; the timezone location of India relative to the
west coast of the US, yet another major software center.10
An understanding of the ongoing role of IT in economic growth
and development is therefore important. The discussion above sug-
gest that it might be useful to consider theoretical extensions to ex-
isting models in two directions: rst, to analyze the role of consumer
attitudes towards sophisticated knowledge-products in determining
aggregate patterns of growth and development; second, to study the
aggregate growth eects of alternative systems of intellectual prop-
erty rights or, more accurately, systems for producing and distributing
knowledge and knowledge-products. In this paper, I take up only the
rst, and leave the second for subsequent research.
2.4 China in the Sung and Yuan dynasties
China from the 14th through 19th centuries provides an interesting
case study for technology-driven economic growth.
Over the Sung (960{1126 C.E.) and Yuan (1127{1367 C.E.) dy-
nasties, China became a technologically advanced economy. It had
in place many of the same technical developments that later made
possible the Industrial Revolution in late 18th-century Britain. Like
Europe four centuries after, 14th-century China had solved the prob-
10 These \death of distance" factors are not the only ones at work,
however. Many Indian software professionals have also begun working
in the US under the new high-tech worker visas agreement, lobbied
for by many Silicon Valley businesses. The number of visas permitted
has increased from 65,000 in 1998 up to 115,000 by 2001, after which
the limit is scheduled to drop back to 65,000.
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lems of making agriculture highly productive, eciently manufactur-
ing ne textiles, exploiting and applying kinetic and thermal energy,
and producing high-quality materials for tools. Yet no Industrial
Revolution occurred in China.11 Why?
In China, blast furnaces for casting iron and rening wrought
from pig iron were in use by 200 B.C.E.; Europe did not achieve
this until the late 14th century. Blast furnaces were being fuelled by
coke from the early 11th century in China|for smelting iron, it was
only in the 18th century that similar technologies became available in
Europe. Indeed, by 1078 China was producing iron per capita at rates
comparable to Europe in 1700; in that year total Chinese iron output
exceeded that for Britain in 1788. In China the price of iron relative
to grain fell from 6.3 in 997 to 1.8 in 1100; iron did not become as
cheap in England until 1700. The iron plow was introduced in the
6th century and was adapted for wet-eld rice cultivation by the 9th
century.
China’s water power development paralleled that in Europe. By
1280 the use of the vertical water wheel was widespread. Gunpowder
had been invented in China before the 11th century, and a thriv-
ing chemicals industry existed to provide, among other things, pow-
erful explosives for military and industrial application. Europeans
did not have gunpowder until the late 13th or early 14th century,
but their subsequent developments of it|for instance, corning the
powder rather than retaining its use in ne-grain form as did the
Chinese|soon gave them the military edge.
Spinning wheels for textiles appeared in China in the 13th cen-
tury, about simultaneous with the West, but advanced faster than in
Europe from adapting earlier Han dynasty expertise in ne silk weav-
ing. Water-powered spinning machines by 1100 were as advanced as
those in early 18th-century Europe, but it was not until the British
11 The descriptions I give below are documented and discussed
further in Derry and Williams [8], Jones [14], Landes [21], McNeill [23,
Ch. 2], and Mokyr [24]. After describing Sung Chinese technical
advances, Mokyr [24, p. 213] concludes that \China was about ready
to undergo a process eerily similar to the great British Industrial
Revolution".
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Industrial Revolution that Europe enjoyed similarly systematic ex-
ploitation of central power sources for textile working.
Chinese water clocks of the 11th century were, according to some,
more accurate than contemporary European timekeeping devices.12
Su Sung’s water clock of 1086 was 40 ft. high and showed not just
the time but a range of astronomical indicators, including the posi-
tions of the moon and planets: it is widely viewed by historians as a
technological masterpiece.
After its invention in China from before the rst century, paper
took over 1000 years to reach the West (and then only after some
Chinese paper-makers were taken prisoner by Arabs in a battle for
Samarkand). China was using block-printing by the late 7th century
and porcelain moveable type from 1045, four centuries before Guten-
berg. Metal type was available from the early 13th century. The
invention of the compass around 960 allowed Chinese junks to be the
most advanced navigators in the world. On top of this, Chinese ships
were from 1400 constructed using watertight bouyancy chambers, a
superior technique of ship construction not adopted by the West until
the 19th century.
Yet, all this|four hundred years earlier than the West|sparked
no takeo remotely comparable to the late 18th century Industrial
Revolution in Britain and Europe. Indeed, by the 1800s, China was
widely recognized to be technologically backward relative to Eng-
land. The Chinese were aware of this from as early as 1600. The
1842 Opium War between Britain and China showed the power of
superior technology in exacting a punishing defeat on a once-proud
empire. Technology did not simply stagnate; absolute regress oc-
curred. By the 16th century, Chinese time measurement had become
again primitive, despite Su Sung’s waterclock of ve centuries earlier.
A number of puzzles emerge: Why did technological innovation
wither away towards the end of the Yuan dynasty? If technology is cu-
mulative and path dependent|with success building upon success|
why did China not continue to be the world’s technology leader?
12 Landes [21] points out that European mechanical timepieces soon
showed their superiority. Water clocks were not durable; their mech-
anisms wore down and became unreliable faster.
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And, after themselves acknowledging their backwardness from the
17th century on, why did the Chinese not seek to copy the superior
Western technology they could readily observe?13
The puzzle lies not just in a comparison between China and Eu-
rope, but between a dynamic, innovative China before 1400 and a
stagnant, regressing China after. Cultural explanations alone, there-
fore, cannot suce.
The hypothesis explored in this paper is a re-interpretation of
one advanced by Mokyr [24, Ch. 9]: a mismatch appeared between
patterns of supply and demand for technology. In contrast with the
situation in Europe, the Chinese state was a signicant player for
determining demand for ideas and for technology. When the Chinese
government withdrew support, private enterprise was unable to step
in suciently quickly. By contrast, no one government controlled all
of Europe, and even within nations, the state was but one of a number
of competing customers for ideas and technology.14
The Chinese state and bureaucracy changed after 1400. For one,
13 Mokyr [24, p. 209] calls the failure of 14th-century China to
maintain its position of superiority \the greatest enigma in the history
of technology".
14 Krussel and Rios-Rull [20] give an alternative formalization,
also citing Mokyr [24]. In their work, the state and bureaucracy|
vested interests|are averse to allowing new technology to dissemi-
nate. Overly restrictive control can then lead to stagnation. In the
development below, the state is viewed as just one among others on
the demand side for technology (although admittedly not very many
others). Europe too had reactionary governments and ruling classes
with vested interests. Unlike China, however, no single state con-
trolled all of the European continent. Europe managed to prosper
and eventually underwent an Industrial Revolution while China did
not. Thus, it is not vested interests alone that were critical, but
instead the overall pattern of demand. I interpret the Chinese sit-
uation after 1400 as a change \of preferences, of attitudes toward
technological change and its consequences"|Mokyr [24, p. 232] used
this phrasing to compare Europe and China after 1400, but it seems
to me to apply equally well to several other explanations he provides.
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when the Mongols conquered China and established the Yuan dy-
nasty, the switch to the non-iron based Mongol military technology
eventually reduced iron demand to a degree signicantly aecting re-
lated products. The coal industry, which had been active from the
early 11th century, fell into decline. Mines came to exploit only shal-
low excavations; operators discarded the use of machinery for pump-
ing, ventilation, or moving out the mined product. Mining changed
from a state of relatively advanced technology to one relatively prim-
itive.
The government in China viewed technology and knowledge as its
exclusive domain. Time itself belonged to the Emperor, and the gov-
ernment attempted to monopolize both its measurement and the use
of the calendar. It was the Emperor who instructed government o-
cials to commission and use Su Sung’s waterclock masterpiece. Before
the Mongols, the Imperial government established state-owned iron
foundries to promote using iron implements. The Sung government
encouraged farmers to use improved technology by directly providing
nancial incentives: from the Han period onwards, the state pro-
vided peasants with the physical capital necessary for technological
improvement, including tools and draft animals, and promoted the
use of more advanced plows. Early on, the Yuan dynasty continued
to actively promote the use of new textiles.
Therefore, before 1400, the state in China played an important
role in generating demand for technology. When this Imperial support
was withdrawn after 1400, technology stagnated and regressed.
In Europe, by contrast, technical change arose mostly from private
and explicitly commercial demand. Governments and rulers were
typically secondary and passive. James Watt and Matthew Boulton
had immediate customers for their steam engines in Cornish tin-mines
and a fast-growing iron industry. For them it was the supply side|
skilled labor, specialized material and tools; nancial support|that
provided the binding constraints.
The example of 14th-century China shows that the demand for
knowledge and technology matters for growth and development. In
China the supply of technology was present, but changing patterns
of demand led to technology rst growing rapidly, then languishing,
and nally actually regressing. Economic growth failed as a result.
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Viewing technology in a way that distances the consumers and
producers of knowledge disguises this connection between demand
and supply. The shared characteristic with information technology
now is that, once again, the consumer side comes into direct con-
tact with technology and knowledge-products. On the supply side of
IT, technology has, arguably, advanced beyond consumers’ comfort
threshold; the demand side is suspicious of IT because of the implied
potential loss of privacy, its complexity of use, and the perceived
fragility of the technology. How growth and development will unfold
depends on the response of the demand side in using sophisticated
goods, the intellectual property environment that fosters ongoing de-
velopment in technology, and the equilibrium reactions of the supply
side.
To analyze these interactions, we turn now to a model that formal-
izes the idea that the demand side matters for technological progress
and in determining equilibrium growth outcomes. The model is a
simplied, steady-state version of that studied in Quah [31].
3 THE MODEL
Assume an economy having distinct populations of producers and
consumers, and proceeding in discrete time t = 0; 1; 2; : : : ;1.
Producers will maximize expected present discounted value of
revenues over occupational choice|working as an entrepreneur in
the knowledge(-products) industry or at a safer job. Knowledge-
products|software or ideas|can have either established high qual-
ity or be experimental, with the possibility of emerging as success or
failure. The payo to working in knowledge-products is determined
endogenously in equilibrium.
Consumers choose which knowledge-products to purchase. They
are characterized by heterogeneity in their aversion towards using the
knowledge-product. Depending on the distribution of this hedonic
cost, a range of equilibria can emerge. Put dierently, consumer
attitudes towards the use of sophisticated technologies determines
the growth outcome in equilibrium.
In some equilibria, the knowledge-products industry languishes;
in others, it is vital and fast-growing.
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Although not central to this paper, implications on income dis-
tribution dynamics also follow from the model. Producers display
Superstar outcomes in the sense of Rosen [33] and MacDonald [22]:
income distributions are an emergent spreading-apart of those in un-
derlying attributes, and are related to the clusters or groupings in
consumers.15
The model is naturally interpreted as one of the software industry.
Equally, however, it can be viewed to capture important elements of
other idea-producing activities, such as the academic profession for
one.
3.1 Producers
Producers are drawn from two-period lived overlapping generations
that are born ex-ante identical. Every generation contains P potential
producers, each seeking to maximize over choice of occupation and
output supplied the present discounted value of expected prots, with
discount factor  2 (0; 1).
Fig. 3 shows the demography and timing of decisions. When mem-
bers of generation t are born at the beginning of period t, they decide
whether to become regular workers or to develop ideas for the knowl-
edge or  industry. If they choose to be regular workers, they earn the
outside option w(t) at time t. If, however, a member of generation
t becomes an idea-developer at time t, she produces a knowledge-
product with quality x(t) 2 (0;1). (Ideas and knowledge-products
are synonymous in the model.) The x subscript denotes experimental,
and x is the same across all active experimenting idea-developers|
young and old|in a given time period. Quantity x evolves across
time periods; its dynamics are described below.
When old, those in generation t who were previously regular work-
ers can either continue to be regular workers|now at the outside op-
tion wage w(t + 1)|or they can start to be idea-developers. If the
latter, because they are new at idea-developing, the old of generation
t produce x(t+ 1), as do the young of generation t+ 1.
15 The dynamics resemble those for income distributions across
countries (Quah [27, 28]).
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Those in generation t who when young were in the knowledge-
products business are seasoned developers by time t + 1. If such an
agent continues to develop knowledge-products when old, she pro-
duces an idea that is a random variable realizing as either s(t + 1)
(success) with probability  or f (t+1) (failure) with complementary
probability 1− .
Success and failure outcomes are distinguished by
8 t : f (t+ 1) < s(t+ 1);
and are distributed independently across seasoned idea-producers.
The (s; f ) pair can be attained only by those who have undergone
the experimental stage, i.e., an initial release is necessary before a
knowledge-product matures to become a success or a failure.16
Extensions of this work would usefully consider replacing this ex-
ogenous (; 1−) probability mechanism for describing successes and
failures. Entrepreneur talent and skills will, in general, determine
success, although other factors might matter as well. For instance,
a low-technology installed base or|more interesting for the perspec-
tive developed in this work|consumption network externalities could
lead to economic successes, s, that are not identical with technolog-
ical ones (Arthur [3] and David [5]). The current work assumes away
those eects, but planned future research will seek to integrate them
with those emphasized here.
At t the experimental knowledge-product has quality x(t) bor-
rowing from the current state of acknowledged successes s(t), i.e.,
x(t) = xs(t); with 0 < x < 1: (1)
Let Px(t) 2 [0;P] denote the number of young in period t working as
idea-producers. I will assume that when Px diers from zero, both
it and P are suciently large to allow a law of large numbers across
producers.
Assume that success quality evolves as:
8 t  0 : s(t+ 1) =
(
0s(t) if Px(t) = 0;
ss(t) otherwise;
(2)
16 We might think of this in the vernacular as requiring a beta ver-
sion or a version 1.0 before a knowledge-product becomes established.
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with s  1 > 0 > 0 and s(0) > 0 given. Equation (2) species, as
a simplication, that growth in s does not vary smoothly in Px, but
depends only on whether some young are working as idea-producers.
When those exist, growth is at rate s; otherwise, growth is lower at
rate 0. Indeed, since 0 < 1, the economy actually regresses when
there are no experimenting idea-producers.
A dierent and perhaps more natural specication might have
growth rates continue to increase as Px rises. Equation (2), appro-
priately monotone increasing in Px, simplies the analysis without
giving up that intuition. The constant proportionality in (1) means
that with a lag the growth rate in experimental quality equals that
in success quality, regardless of which branch of (2) is active.
Because 0 < 1 technical regress occurs in the absence of exper-
imental activity. This, however, is inessential: what matters is only
that s > 0 so that we could have, for instance, 0 = 1. Then, no
technical regress occurs, even when idea-producers are inactive for
several periods: Progress simply picks up where it had earlier left o.
Assume that experimental idea-products have quality intermedi-
ate between that of failures and successes, x(t) 2 (f (t); s(t)), and
that there is free entry into the knowledge-product industry.
We have discussed knowledge-product quality. Turn now to the
costs of producing knowledge-products in quantity. From Arrow [2],
and following Arthur [3], Krugman [19], and Romer [32], it is nat-
ural to suppose that such marginal costs are either zero or falling.
However, to focus on the eects that are novel here, assume not the
standard increasing returns, but that it costs an idea-producer t(G)
at time t to supply G units of her knowledge-product, with t(0) = 0,
0t > 0, and 00t > 0. Costs t are, therefore, taken to be identical
across , although varying through time. Invariance in  of marginal
costs then gives increasing returns in the  direction, although there
is no increasing returns in the quantity G direction.
At any time t three kinds of knowledge-products, f (t), x(t),
and s(t), are potentially traded. Denote their corresponding spot
prices pf (t), px(t), and ps(t). This notation imposes that knowledge-
products in the same class command the same price. In a given time
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period an idea-producer with knowledge-product  receives prot
R = max
G0
pG− (G); (3)
so that optimal G and R increase in p. Indeed, from the envelope
theorem, the rate at which R increases in p is (0)−1(p) and is itself
increasing in p. The more convex is , the more skewed is the implied
distribution of revenues across producers for a given conguration of
prices. Because (0) = 0, we must have R nonnegative. LabelRf , Rx,
and Rs the prots corresponding to the dierent classes of knowledge-
products, and let the associated supply decisions be Gf , Gx, and Gs.
If pf < px < ps, then so too Rf < Rx < Rs with absolute dierences
magnied from those in p.
Finally, assume that the outside option w(t) and the cost struc-
ture t evolve exogenously. For existence of equilibrium, it will be
convenient to assume that w in each period falls in an appropriate in-
termediate range. The conditions determining that range don’t have
a directly interesting economic interpretation; so I assume here only
that the outside option w is neither too large nor too small.
To summarize the essential elements above, write the producer’s
problem as the value equation:
Rx + 

maxfR0s; w0g+ (1− ) maxfR0f ; R0x; w0g

= w + maxfR0x; w0g; (4)
where 0 denotes values in the second period of life. When (4) is
satised, producers are indierent across occupations. The demand
side then determines Px.
3.2 Consumers
Consumers live for one period, at the beginning of which each receives
exogenous income Y . The number of consumers is C constant through
time. Heterogeneity across consumers is indexed by  2 (−1;1)
distributed following cdf F. Population heterogeneity and incomes
evolve exogenously so that at t they are Ft and Y (t) respectively.
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Two kinds of goods can be consumed: knowledge-products and a
numeraire composite commodity. Consumption of the rst is time-
consuming, so that|as in Shaked and Sutton [34]|in a lifetime at
most one knowledge-product from a single class can be consumed.
Consumer type  solves the problem:
max
c0
2ff ;x;sg
S ;
U(c; 1)
s.t. c+ (p + )1  Y
(5)
with
Uc > 0; U > 0 and lim
c!0
U(c; ) = 0 for xed ; (6)
and 1 denoting the indicator function on ff ; x; sg.
The budget constraint in (5) says that consuming  entails pay-
ment on top of the sticker price p the further cost . Condition (6)
says that consumers value both composite commodity quantity and
knowledge-product quality , but leaves unrestricted the substitution
propensities across the two kinds of goods.
The higher is type , the more costly is consuming the knowledge-
product. Although  diers across consumers, it is invariant to qual-
ity . This has two interpretations. First, following Rosen [33],
 can be viewed as measuring the opportunity cost of time. The
act of consuming knowledge-products|like enjoying opera or ath-
letic performances|takes time. The opportunity cost of that time
does not depend on whether the opera or knowledge-product is high-
or low-quality, only on whether or not the consumer attends the per-
formance. High- consumers would then, other things equal, have a
further reason for selecting high-quality knowledge-products.
Second,  can be viewed as parameterizing the cost of learn-
ing. The higher is , the less easily the consumer learns to ac-
cess and appreciate a particular knowledge-product.17 Put dier-
ently,  describes tacit knowledge. It is knowledge that is specic to
17 For knowledge-products that are computer software, there might
be a specic set of conventions|keyboard and mouse actions, menu
congurations, and so on|one has to learn that is common to all
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individuals|hence its distribution across the population|and not
innitely expansible. Tacit knowledge is what allows users to access
and exploit knowledge-products. In this second interpretation, nega-
tive  can be interpreted as a subsidy to learning.
In either interpretation,  invariant over  means that consumers
nd it no easier or harder to appreciate an experimental x than they
do an established success s. Thus, in the model the inherent quality
of the knowledge-product is fully described by  in the utility function,
not by its potentially aecting the budget constraint in (5). Type 
describes consumer attitudes towards knowledge-products altogether,
not towards any one of them.
Consumer type  can always choose to consume no knowledge-
product at all, in which case  is irrelevant and all income is spent
on the composite commodity c. Otherwise, composite commodity
consumption c = Y − p − , whereupon utility is U(Y − p − ; ).
Call Cx the number of consumers choosing x. Similarly, let Cf
and Cs be the number of consumers choosing f and s respectively.
3.3 Equilibrium
Producers and consumers understand the laws of motion of the dif-
ferent variables in the economy, and in particular those (unspecied
in the discussion thus far) in the exogenous quantities w, , F, and
Y .
An equilibrium is a sequence of spot prices and occupation and
supply decisions such that all consumers maximize utility and all
members of the producer populations maximize expected present dis-
counted value of prots. Formally, we seek sequences
fpf (t); px(t); ps(t);Px(t); Gf (t); Gx(t); Gs(t) : t = 0; 1; : : : ; Tg
satisfying (3), (4), and (5), given the exogenous evolution of outside
software, but the quality of screen presentations and metaphor de-
velopments in the product dier across ’s. For knowledge-products
that are ideas, one might have to learn the technical language in which
such ideas are expressed, but that language is invariant to the quality
of the ideas themselves.
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options w(t), cost structure t, consumer attitudes Ft, and incomes
Y (t).
The discussion is considerably simplied if we focus on equilibria
bearing a stationarity property. It is convenient for this to take s =
1, i.e., the economy even with ongoing successful innovation shows
zero growth (without ongoing innovation, on the other hand, the
economy decays at rate 0). Dene a stationary equilibrium to be
an equilibrium where for all t
pf (t+ 1) = pf (t); px(t+ 1) = px(t); ps(t+ 1) = ps(t);
Px(t+ 1) = Px(t);
and
Gf (t+ 1) = Gf (t); Gx(t+ 1) = Gx(t); Gs(t+ 1) = Gs(t):
Assume that the exogenous quantities are, similarly, time-invariant,
i.e.,
w(t+ 1) = w(t); t+1 = t; Ft+1 = Ft; Y (t+ 1) = Y (t):
Hereafter, we study only such stationary equilibria.
Free entry implies that in each period Rx  w. Moreover, since
f < x < s and utility is increasing in , we must have pf < px < ps,
and therefore Rf < Rx < Rs. The producer’s value equation (4) then
becomes
Rx + maxfR0s; w0g = w + w0 = (1 + )w: (7)
However, if R0s  w0 then Rx = w  Rs, which is a contradiction.
Thus, in each period Rf < Rx < w < Rs. New idea-developers accept
low earnings temporarily so that they can later potentially become
high-earning Superstar successes. Those idea-developers whose ex-
periments turned out to be failures exit the market and work the
outside option.
In equilibrium, therefore, no f ’s are produced. Call s the state
of consuming s while paying price ps; similarly dene x. The con-
sumer’s problem (5) reduces to:
max
2fx;sg
S ; fU(Y − ps − ; s); U(Y − px − ; x); U(Y; 0)g: (8)
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For xed Y and (p; ), the function U(Y − p − ; ) decreases with
. Taking variation in type , the three functions U(Y − ps − ; s),
U(Y − px − ; x), and U(Y; 0) can be graphed as in Figs. 4{6. In all
cases, the solution to (8) traces out the upper envelope of the three
schedules in U .
Figs. 4{6 show that exactly three outcomes are possible: the
graphs of U(Y − ps− ; s) and U(Y − px− ; x) might intersect, or
they might not (Fig. 4). If the former, the intersection might occur
below U(Y; 0) (Fig. 5) or above (Fig. 6). (In principle, multiple inter-
sections might occur. Conditions on U that rule out such multiplicity
are available, but don’t seem to add much insight. Thus I simply take
the single intersection possibility as primitive.)
Taking (Y; ps; px) as given dene int to be the intersection in 
of U(Y − ps − ; s) and U(Y − px − ; x), i.e.,
int
def= f 3 U(Y − ps − ; s) = U(Y − px − ; x)g :
Let max be the larger of the intersections of U(Y − ps − ; s) and
U(Y − px − ; x), respectively, with U(Y; 0), i.e.,
max
def= max(f 3 U(Y − px − ; x) = U(Y; 0)g;
f 3 U(Y − ps − ; s) = U(Y; 0)g):
From (6), threshold max always exists, even if int might not.
The cases depicted in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 are, in eect, the same.
In either Figure, only two types of consumption behavior occur: one
or the other of x and s (but not both), or no knowledge-product
at all. However, neither situation in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 is sustainable.
To see this, note that no idea-producer works at x for Rx < w
when in the next period s experiences zero demand. Conversely, no
idea-producer achieves the maturity to produce s if no demand is
expressed for x when she is young. By contrast, Fig. 6 describes
sustained technological progress.
China in the 14th century is, in this analysis, an example of Fig. 4
and Fig. 5. From a position where technical advances regularly oc-
curred and were sustained (Fig. 6), the  distribution shifted upwards,
leading to where the induced demand for technical advances became
progressively narrower and nally non-existent.
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Turn to Fig. 6, where technical advances can be sustained. Here,
again, there are two cases: U(Y − ps − ; s) can intersect U(Y −
px − ; x) from above (Fig. 7) or from below (Fig. 8). Which of
the two obtains depends on the interaction between possibilities of
substitution across c and  and on the conguration of quality  and
equilibrium price p. (For instance, CES functional forms for U can
give either Fig. 7 or Fig. 8, depending on whether the elasticity of
substition exceeds 1. The standard Cobb-Douglas special case gives
Fig. 7.)
I have labelled Fig. 7 the Learning Society because in it the mid-
dle class|as measured by their type  falling in a range interme-
diate between the very low and very high|choose to consume the
experimental x. It is this middle group of consumers that supports
innovation and experimentation in the knowledge-products industry.
By contrast in the Conservative Society of Fig. 8 the middle class
chooses only established successes. It is now those with low ’s who
demand experimental knowledge-products.
The distinction between the two societies in Figs. 7{8 is substan-
tive. If, for example, governments seek to subsidize learning by reduc-
ing consumers’ opportunity costs (induce negative ), they will end
up only subsidizing consumption of established successes in Fig. 8, not
of the experimental knowledge-products, as would happen in Fig. 7.
(Of course, increasing the demand for s does have, in general, pos-
itive knock-on eects for x since dynamic rewards then increase for
those in the knowledge-products industry.)
To see that a stationary equilibrium exists for both the Learning
and Conservative Societies, we proceed in steps. In either society, no
f is produced and we can set Cf = 0. In the Learning Society, de-
mand for successful knowledge-products is Cs = F (int) while supply
is PxG(ps); demand for experimental knowledge-products is Cx =
F (max)−F (int) while supply is PxG(px). Holding xed the number
of experimenting idea-developers Px, an increase in ps reduces F (int)
and increases G(ps); an increase in px reduces F (max)−F (int) and
increases G(px). Thus, for xed Px, a price pair (px; ps) clearing the
knowledge-product markets always exists. The same conclusion holds
for the Conservative Society, remembering to reverse both the inter-
pretations and the supplies that correspond to the dierent demands
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F (int) and F (max)− F (int).
Of course, for arbitrary Px the (px; ps) pair that clears knowledge-
product markets need not satisfy the producer value equation (7).
But the left-hand side of (7) varies continuously in Px so that provided
w falls in an appropriate intermediate range (as discussed above),
then there always exists an equilibrium sub-population Px of idea-
producers in (0;P) such that the knowledge-product market-clearing
prices then also imply revenues (Rx; Rs) satisfying (7).
In the model, the exact value of the outside option w, once it
falls within the appropriate range, does not matter for the equilib-
rium. This feature is an artifact, however, of the discreteness in the
dynamics in (2). More generally, the relation between w and the
rate of growth will behave as in Romer [32], where w is endogenously
determined by the productivity of the alternative (not knowledge-
producing) sector.
Summarizing, a stationary equilibrium always exists and has the
properties described in Figs. 7{8.
3.4 Income mobility and inequality: Distribution dynamics
Equilibrium, regardless of whether it is in the Learning or Conserva-
tive Societies, displays certain properties common to all Superstars
models. Other features, however, are a little surprising.
The central Superstars result holds in the model. From con-
sumers’ optimization, price p is increasing in quality . Since produc-
tion costs  are invariant to , high-quality idea-producers optimally
produce more than low-quality ones. The reasoning surrounding (3)
then gives that prots are a convex function of quality, so that there
is the usual skewed income distribution, already familiar from Mac-
Donald [22] and Rosen [33].
Only a few Superstars (Px) survive to earn very high rewards.
At the same time, many more experimenters (Px) enter the industry
at low immediate earnings, anticipating that they too might become
Superstar producers in the future. Many of them fail, however, and
exit the industry.
Finally, since Rx < w, no producer begins a career as an idea-
developer in midlife. A regular worker when young remains a regular
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worker throughout.
On the consumer side, as expected from the standard Superstars
reasoning, those with high opportunity or learning costs |on the
extreme right of Figs. 7{8|spend none of their resources on the
knowledge-product. But then, however, unlike in MacDonald [22]
and Rosen [33], there is no necessary monotonicity in consumption
patterns.
To be clear on this, recall the discussion of opera consumption in
MacDonald [22] and Rosen [33]. High  consumers nd their time
opportunity costs too high and consume no opera at all. Slightly
lower  consumers never nd it worthwhile to try out experimental
(potentially) low-quality opera, and instead always consume just the
established successes. Finally, the least discriminating consumers,
with lowest ’s, only go to cheaper experimental, low-quality opera.
Here, by contrast, intermediate consumers with  2 (int; max) do
not always consume just the high-quality knowledge-product. In the
Learning Society of Fig. 7, those middle- consumers experiment|
the equilibrium price px turns out to be suciently low to induce
them to do so. It is only in the Conservative Society of Fig. 8 that
the middle- consumers choose to consume high-quality established
successes s.
Although somewhat outside the model, a leapfrogging interpreta-
tion is also available. In the Learning Society Fig. 7, those with small-
est ’s|who have the lowest opportunity cost of time|bypass the
lower-quality experimental products and latch right on to the high-
quality ones. If we identied such consumers as the least-developed
economies (ignoring the assumption that, in the model, Y is the same
across all consumers), Fig. 7 says that they immediately jump to the
knowledge frontier. At the same time, however, those economies al-
ready relatively developed, with ’s in an intermediate range, choose
to learn and use only experimental technologies (because the price
on those is relatively low in equilibrium). In the Conservative Soci-
ety Fig. 8, the situation is reversed. The least-developed economies
only use lower-quality experimental knowledge-products, while the
relatively more-developed ones, only the established high-quality suc-
cesses.
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4 CONCLUSION
This paper studied the importance of the demand side in studying
technology and growth, with special reference to the development of
information technology.
Knowledge and technology development have long been recog-
nized to be important in economic growth. This paper considered
the conjecture that what matters most in modern technologies|
information technology and other knowledge-like goods|is not that
the resulting goods continue to be knowledge-intensive, but that they
have many of the same physical and economic properties as knowledge
itself.
Because these changes are relatively recent, however, time-series
evidence on their importance is dicult to obtain. By the same token,
it is hard to disentangle empirically what factors and institutional
structures will matter for their ongoing evolution.
This paper took instead the view that weightless-economy changes
are signicant because they shorten the relevant \distance" between
consumers and producers of knowledge-products. This then allows
analysis on two fronts. First, what is special about the knowledge
embodied in IT for economic growth? What interesting economic
features do traditional models of knowledge and growth miss? For
one, in reality, copyrights matter for IT more than do patents for
protecting knowledge as intellectual property. But copyrights protect
in ways fundamentally dierent from patents; compared to the latter,
the level of protection aorded is weak. One reason this can be sus-
tained is that the cost to consumers of using IT is not just the sticker
price of the product, but the associated costs of learning to consume
the knowledge-product.
Second, what does empirical evidence show in other situations
where similar distance-reduction has occurred? Clearly, 14th-century
China, for one, did not have computers and information technology.
But, as argued above, the tensions manifest between mismatched
demand and supply sides of technology can provide useful lessons.
Building on these observations, the paper then developed an ana-
lytical model to show how demand side factors can produce a range of
predictions consistent with both 14th-century China and the current
information technology industry.
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One policy implication from this study is the importance of train-
ing and education, not just in providing skills for work and produc-
tion, but in providing a suciently strong demand base. Unless a
demand side can be cultivated that appreciates and exploits sophis-
ticated and advancing technology, economic growth can slow or, ul-
timately, fail to continue. Training and education need not be along
narrowly-dened skills dimensions, but they can provide a double
impact in strengthening both demand and supply sides of technical
development.
Finally, patterns of demand emerge not just from developing skills
and education in the population at large. They are aected also by
government eorts at regulation. Government policy that strongly
curtails private use of new technologies|excess taxation, insucient
access provision|can have adverse long-run consequences on growth
in the economy.
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Fig. 1: Traditional models of knowledge and growth Patents
and machinery intermediate between knowledge production and con-
sumers
Skilled People
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Fig. 2: Weightless economy Reduced distance between knowl-
edge production and consumers
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Fig. 3: Producer Demography and Decisions Environment
and move sequence for generation t.
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Fig. 4: Non-existent int Only 2 kinds of consumption activity
occur: One or the other kP (but not both) and no kP.
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Fig. 5: Both intersections exist with max < int Again, only
2 kinds of consumption activity occurring: One or the other kP (but
not both) and no kP.
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Fig. 6: Dispersed case with int < max All 3 kinds of consump-
tion activity occur.
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Fig. 7: The learning society Intermediate ’s consume experi-
mentation.
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Fig. 8: The conservative society Intermediate ’s consume es-
tablished successes.
